A recent report by the US consultancy Finadium lauded a paper by Professor Bruce Tuckman of the NYU Stern School of Business who wisely cautioned against too severely discouraging the use of derivatives through regulation. The main argument by Prof Tuckman is that derivatives and forwards can provide synthetic positions that have equivalent risk exposures…
Author: Richard Comotto
Anxiety, Overconfidence and Excessive Risk-Taking
I have been doing some work on money market codes of conduct. In my research, I came across a fascinating article on “Anxiety, Overconfidence and Excessive Risk-Taking” by Thomas Eisenbach and Martin Schmalz (FRBNY Staff Report No.71, March 2015). The authors note that it is widely accepted and well substantiated that people tend to systematically…
Do bans on naked short-selling undermine price discovery? A new paper every regulator should read.
In a recently published research paper, ‘Fails-to-Deliver, Short Selling and Market Quality’, three academics from Warwick University — Veljko Fotak, Vikas Raman and Predeep Yadav — attempt to measure the impact on market quality of regulatory measures to prohibit settlement failures in the US equity market. It is an excellent piece of practical research and…
Academics need a ‘living wage’ too — consultants please note!
Dear consultancy firms, You frequently ‘phone and e-mail me to talk about the repo market. You want to pick my brains. No problem. I would like to pick yours. Occasionally, we have had an exchange of information, not necessarily a fair exchange but enough for me to be able to say that I have learnt…
Say goodbye to ‘re-hypothecation’ and ‘re-use’. Say hello to ‘re-sale’
What’s in a word? Well, in the quasi-legal world of regulation, it can be everything! For example, in the post-crisis regulatory dialogue over the repo market, the words ‘re-hypothecation’ and ‘re-use’ have been causing endless mischief. This blog proposes that we therefore dispense with those misnomers and import the word ‘re-sale’ as a less ambiguous…
A good paper on collateral rehypothecation. No need for the spin.
Those interested in the rehypothecation debate should read a paper written by Vincent Maurin of the European University Institute called Re-using the Collateral of Others: A General Equilibrium Model of Rehypothecation (EUI, March 2014). What draws attention is the claim that rehypothecation is unnecessary, that there is a more efficient alternative, and that a ban or restriction on rehypothecation would…
Asking the unthinkable: do central banks really need to take haircuts when lending?
Risk-averse institutions often limit the amount they are willing to lend against collateral to no more than the market value of that collateral less a haircut. Central banks are no exception. At first glance, the idea of any secured lender taking collateral haircuts seems eminently sensible and, in the case of central banks, characteristically prudent….
Problems with the NSFR
Basel III’s Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) was described in a previous blog. This piece identifies some of the undesirable impacts of the proposal. Unsecured versus secured funding One of most notable features of the NSFR is that unsecured and secured funding sources are given the same ASF factors. In the case of interbank funding…
An introduction to the NSFR for repo dealers in a rush
The NSFR is a key Basel III reform to promote a more resilient banking sector by limiting over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding. It is designed to complement the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) but, whereas the LCR focuses on cashflow behaviour under market-wide liquidity stresses over 30 days, the NSFR looks at the resilience of the…
An introduction to the Basel III Net Stable Funding Requirement (NSFR) for insomniacs or obsessives in the repo market
The NSFR measures a bank’s Available Stable Funding (ASF) relative to its Required Stable Funding (RSF). Banks will have to maintain their NSFRs at 100% or more. NSFR= ASF/RSF The NSFR is one of the key Basel III reforms to promote a more resilient banking sector through structural changes in the liquidity risk profiles of…